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ARTICLE 9 AND FIXTURES: A REAL FIX WITH
NO PERFECT SOLUTION*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The law is said to be a seamless web, but the problem of fixtures
can only be called a tangled web."' Nowhere is the fixture web more
tangled than where a real property claimant and a secured creditor
both claim rights in the same fixture. Several situations in which such a
conflict may arise come quickly to mind. First, a subsequent purchaser
or mortgagee may believe that the fixtures are included in his convey-
ance because they are "part" of the realty.' The second situation is
where the fixtures are attached after a mortgagee has acquired an inter-
est in the realty. Upon default by the mortgagor, the mortgagee may
attempt to reach the fixtures in order to reduce any loss. 3 Yet another
situation arises when a bankruptcy trustee assumes the status of hypo-
thetical lien creditor or bona fide purchaser of the realty.4 In order to
understand these controversies, it is necessary to appreciate the diffi-
culty the parties face in ascertaining when goods are or become
"fixtures."
A. What is a Fixture?
The courts and scholars have struggled in vain for a satisfactory
definition of exactly when an object "affixed" to realty becomes a "fix-
ture."5 A gray area lies between the realms of chattel and realty: "Fix-
* The author is especially grateful to Acting Professor Dan S. Schechter of Loyola
Law School of Los Angeles for his helpful guidance during the preparation of this
Comment.
I. Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 51
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Kripke].
2. But see infra text accompanying note 206.
3. In a rising real estate market, the lender probably has an equity cushion sufficient to
prevent loss in the event of foreclosure. The increase in property value makes risk of loss
remote. In a falling real estate market, however, the equity cushion is constantly decreasing.
If the value of the property diminishes to a point below the amount of the encumbrance, the
property value will not cover both the mortgage and the fixture secured creditor. Shanker,
An Integrated Financing Systemfor Purchase Money Collateral- A Proposed Solution to the
Fixture Problem Under Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE L. J. 788,
792 (1964); see also, A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee: A Panel Discus-
sion, 26 Bus. LAw. 307, 316 (1970).
4. See infra notes 117-34 & 159-74 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Horowitz, The Law of Fixtures in Calfornia-A Critical Analysis, 26 S.
CAL. L. REV. 21 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz]. Note, The Definition of Fixture in
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tures are objects so affixed to the realty that it seems odd to call them
personal property because they are not portable; yet, they also are so
ephemeral as compared to land that it is equally disquieting to call
them realty."6 For example, a table is a chattel; land and the improve-
ment thereon is realty. A central air conditioning system falls in the
gray area between "pure" chattel and "pure" real property.7 It proba-
bly would be classified as a fixture under any one of a variety of theo-
ries: because it is "attached" to the realty,' or because it was the
"intent" of the annexor of the air conditioner to make it a permanent
part of the realty,9 or because it is "integrated" into the realty,"° or
because it is part of the "institutional doctrine"'1 or an "assembled in-
dustrial plant."' 2
Article 9 of the U.C.C., 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 841 (1980); Note, Uniform Commercial
Code Section 9-313: Timefor Adoption in Calfornia, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 235 (1975); Note,
Toward a Satis/actory Fixture Defnitionfor the Unform Commercial Code, 55 CORNELL L.
REv. 477 (1970). See also infra note 21 and accompanying text.
6. Note, The Definition of Fixture in Article 9 of the U. C.C., 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
841, 849 (1980). The drafters describe the gray area as "an intermediate class which has
become real estate for certain purposes, but as to which chattel financing may be preserved."
U.C.C. § 9-313 comment 3 (1972).
7. Ayer, The New Article 9 and the Calfornia Commercial Code, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
937, 951 (1974).
8. See, e.g., In re Belmont Indus., 1 Bankr. 608, 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); In re Arlett, 22
Bankr. 732, 734-35 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
9. See, e.g., Courtright Cattle Co. v. Dolsen Co., 94 Wash. 2d 645, 656-57, 619 P.2d
344, 349 (1980); McCarthy v. Bank, 423 A.2d 1280, 1283, 283 Pa. Super. 328, 332 (1980);
Babson Credit Plan, Inc. v. Cordele Production Credit Ass'n, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 437, 440-
41 (1978); George v. Commercial Credit Corp., 440 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1971); Strain v.
Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 699, 172 P.2d 216, 220 (1946); Teaffv. Hewitt, I Ohio St. 511, 530,
59 Am. Dec. 634, 644-45 (1853).
10. See, e.g., Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 545-46, 6 P.2d 952, 954 (193 1) (hotel building
would not be hotel building without heating and plumbing fixtures).
11. See, e.g., In re Cooperstein, 7 Bankr. 618, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying New
Jersey law); Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 313, 316, 178 A. 788, 789 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1935). Professor Gilmore has suggested that the "institutional doctrine" of
fixtures came about because
the New Jersey courts were less interested in priorities than they were in the plight
of tenants in large apartment houses at a time when the collapse of real estate
values had cast an unlovely light on some of the financing methods of the 1920's.
Rather than see a substantial part of the population condemned to camping out on
the New Jersey marshes without heat, light, or refrigeration, the courts ordered that
the essential equipment be left in the apartment houses. This humanitarian gesture
incidentally gave priority to the real estate mortgagee over the purchase money
interest in the equipment.
Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1361 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Gilmore]. Professor Gilmore explained that the institutional doctrine disappeared
from the New Jersey reports after 1940. Id. Apparently the New York bankruptcy court
construing New Jersey law in Cooperstein was unaware of this fact.
12. See, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Pennsylvania Bank and Trust Co., 56 Pa. D.
& C.2d 479, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 858 (1972); Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116, 119 (Pa.
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Scholarly literature abounds with suggested formulations for a
"tidy" definition for fixtures. 3 Most scholars have taken a Procrus-
tean' 4 approach and have tried to force all fixtures into one definitional
class. A fixture is not a fixture for all reasons." One of the most recent
suggestions for a fixture definition within the context of the Uniform
Commericial Code is for "commercial law to abandon the unworkable
and unnecessary concept of fixture. Commercial law should, instead,
focus on establishing priorities between chattel secured creditors and
real estate mortgagees."' 6 Although this is a step in the right direction,
it ignores the priority problems which arise with lien creditors and
bankruptcy trustees.' 7  Neither the secured creditor, the real estate
mortgagee, the lien creditor, nor the trustee really cares how the object
in question is defined, except to the extent that the definition is deemed
to determine or affect the result. The tension which exists between the
two competing interests relates to priority in the collateral, not to
whether the thing itself is a chattel, or realty, or some hybrid. The
secured creditor needs to know, however, how to take advantage of any
priority system. He must be able to predict the outcome so that known
1841) ("Whether fast or loose ... all the machinery of a manufactory which is necessary to
constitute it, and without which it would not be a manufactory at all, must pass for a part of
the freehold."). This doctrine has since been extended to private houses, office buildings,
and restaurants among others. Gilmore, supra note 11, at 1362.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in depth the differences among these
several definitions. It is enough to note that the area is confused.
13. Kripke, supra note 1, at 63; see also note 5 and accompanying text. The definitional
problem is not without its lighter side. In In re Carlyle, the creditor took possession of the
debtor's cactus plant, a rock saw, and a cash register. The debtor claimed these items as part
of his personal property exemption. In a whimsical mood, the court stated: "The parties
having settled the controversy concerning the rock saw and the cactus plant (now deceased),
now bring the matter of the cash register before this Court for determination." 22 Bankr.
743, 743 (C.D. Ill. 1982). The cash register was not a fixture because it was not attached to
or related to the real property. Id. at 744.
14. Proscrustes, of Greek mythology, was a robber of Attica who seized travelers and
tied them to an iron bedstead. If they were shorter than the bed, he stretched their limbs to
make them fit it; if they were longer, he lopped off their legs. T. BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S
MYTHOLOGY 151 (1970).
15. The discussion in this Comment will not consider fixtures in the context of eminent
domain, see, e.g., Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 209, 25 P.2d 826, 831 (1933) (because
printing presses are part of the realty, the condemnee is entitled to just compensation); in the
context of tax cases, see, e.g., Security Data, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa, 145 Cal. App.
3d 108, 117, 193 Cal. Rptr. 121, 126 (1983) (fixtures are real property for purposes of local
taxation); in the context of consumer protection, see, e.g., Williams v. Western Pacific Finan-
cial Corp., 643 F.2d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1981) (Regulation Z issues); or in other areas apart
from commercial law.
16. Note, The Definition of Fixture in Article 9 of the U. C. C., 31 CASE. W. RES. L. REv.
841, 861 (1980).
17. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
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risks can be factored into the credit structure.' 8
B. The Inadequacies of the 1962 Uniform Commercial Code Version
of Section 9-313 and the 1972 Improvements
In 1962, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) set
out, in section 9-313, Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures,19 to pres-
ent a practical, logical system to determine priorities in fixtures.20 The
18. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
19. U.C.C. § 9-313 (1962) provided:
(1) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a struc-
ture in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like
and no security interest in them exists under this Article unless the structure re-
mains personal property under applicable law. The law of this state other than this
Act determines whether and when other goods become fixtures. This Act does not
prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law
applicable to real estate.
(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become fixtures
takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have an interest in
the real estate except as stated in subsection (4).
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures is
valid against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate except as
stated in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person with an interest in the real
estate at the time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not in writing
consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take
priority over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by
judicial proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to
the extent that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained, or
the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted for
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A purchaser
of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an encumbrancer purchasing at
his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this section.
(5) When under subsections (2) or (3) and (4) a secured party has priority
over the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he may, on
default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral from the real
estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is
not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any
physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the
absence of the goods removed or by any necessity for replacing them. A person
entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party
gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation.
Arguably, goods enumerated in section 9-313(1) are more properly classified as "acces-
sions." See U.C.C. § 9-314(1) (1962). This section has not been amended. U.C.C. § 9-
314(l) (1972). The author concurs with Professor Gilmore: "[T]he problem of accessions is
one of limited interest which could hardly be expected to excite the passions of even the
most fanatical devotee of Article 9. It will not be further discussed in this paper." Gilmore,
supra note 11, at 1371 n.91.
20. A Second Look at the Amendments to Article 9 of the Unform Commercial Code: A
Panel, 29 Bus. LAW. 973, 982 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Panel].
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drafters did not understand the complexity of the task they had under-
taken and even they admitted failure.21 California flatly rejected this
version of section 9-313.22 Then, in 1972, the drafters presented the
states with an overhauled version of section 9-313.23 After considerable
21. "The draftsmen of the Code assumed that. . . Section 7 of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act (USCA) had worked satisfactorily . . .; the problem was simply to redraft and
clarify the solutions of the USCA and to integrate them into the Code. How wrong we
were!" Kripke, supra note 1, at 46. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313, 3
U.L.A. 580 (1981); Coogan, Fixtures-Uniformity in Words or in Fact? 113 U. PA. L. REV.
1186 (1964); Gilmore, supra note 11; Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1319 (1961).
The USCA was the first attempt to organize the myriad differing rules in the various
states concerning the sales of goods. Its success was limited, being adopted in only 12 states.
Kripke, supra note I, at 47.
22. Final Report of the Unform Commercial Code Committee on Section 9-313 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1979-1980 CAL. ASSEMBLY DAILY J. 19,429, 19,431 [hereinafter
cited as Final Report]. It was no more popular in some other states. See Nathan, Priorities
in Fixture Collateral in Ohio: A Proposalfor Reform, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 719, 720 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Nathan]. Ohio reversed the priority provisions of the 1962 Code. Idaho
reversed the Code's priority scheme where one party had an interest in the real property at
the time the goods became fixtures. Iowa specifically rendered Article 9 inapplicable where
one of the claimants held an interest in real property. Id.
23. The revised version of § 9-313 "is an attempt to meet that problem in hopes that the
states like California and Ohio, which did not adopt Section 9-313 at all or modified it out of
recognition might come back into the fold and yet leave other states with a program that we
can live with." A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee.- A Panel Discussion,
26 Bus. LAw. 307, 316 (1970). The 1972 version of § 9-313 provides:
(I) In this section and in the provisions of Part 4 of this Article referring to fixture
filing, unless the context otherwise requires
(a) goods are "fixtures" when they become so related to particular real estate
that an interest in them arises under real estate law
(b) a "fixture filing" is the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate would be filed or recorded of a financing statement covering goods
which are or are to become fixtures and conforming to the requirements
of subsection (5) of Section 9-402
(c) a mortagage is a "construction mortgage" to the extent that it secures an
obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land in-
cluding the acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indi-
cates.
(2) A security interest under this Article may be created in goods which are fix-
tures or may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no security interest
exists under this Article in ordinary building materials incorporated into an im-
provement on land.
(3) This Article does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures pur-
suant to real estate law.
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting inter-
est of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the
security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become
fixtures or within ten days thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of
record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; or
(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the security interest has priority
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hesitancy, California took the 1972 Uniform version, reworked it, and
adopted a nonuniform version of section 9-313 in 1980.24
This Comment will (1) show why and how California modified
UCC section 9-313, (2) explain why the modified California version
should be adopted by the UCC, (3) point out the unresolved tangles
still remaining in fixture law, and (4) show how they might be
unraveled.
over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer
or owner, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is
in possession of the real estate; or
(c) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines or readily
removable replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer
goods, and before the goods become fixtures the security interest is per-
fected by any method permitted by this Article; or
(d) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or
equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any
method permitted by this Article.
(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over the
conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the security inter-
est or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer
or owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the priority of the security
interest continues for a reasonable time.
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to sub-
sections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction
mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures
before the completion of the construction. To the extent that it is given to refinance
a construction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as the
construction mortgage.
(7) In cases not within the preceeding subsections, a security interest in fixtures is
subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related
real estate who is not the debtor.
(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encumbrancers of
the real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his
collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner
of the real estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the
cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real
estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing
them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until
the secured party gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation.
The 1972 version of section 9-401 makes it clear that fixture filings are to be kept where the
mortgages on the real estate would be filed or recorded. U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972). See also
infra note 64.
24. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1156.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA VERSION OF UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 9-313
A. California Rejected the 1962 Version of Commercial
Code Section 9-313
1. Deficiencies in the 1962 version
The 1962 Code required that an initial determination be made that
the goods were fixtures under state law before the priority provisions
were triggered.2" The definitional problem caused immediate uncer-
tainty and made it difficult for the secured creditor to determine how to
achieve priority under section 9-313.26 California was one of the states
without a precise definition of fixtures.27 Further, section 9-313 as-
sumed a tripartite division of property: chattel, realty, and fixtures.
28
In some states, however, there were only two classifications of property:
chattel and realty.2 9 In those states, when an object became a fixture it
lost its chattel status and became realty.30 Section 9-313 was unwork-
able from the outset in those states, including California, without a tri-
partite division of property because a fixture does not exist as an
independent entity apart from the realty.
In addition, construction lenders were disfavored under section 9-
313 of the UCC.3I A lender who perfected his interest in goods before
they became fixtures obtained a superior claim to the goods over the
lender who had provided the underlying funds for construction of the
entire unit. 2
25. U.C.C. § 9-313(1) (1962). See supra note 19.
26. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
28. Nathan, supra note 22, at 732.
29. Id. See also SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE BY SENATE FACT
FINDING CoMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, PART I, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 577-78
(1959-1961) [hereinafter cited as Marsh and Warren Report].
30. See, e.g., In re Arlett, 22 Bankr. 732, 734-35 (E.D. Cal. 1982), and infra notes 150-58
and accompanying text.
31. U.C.C. § 9-313(2) (1962). See supra note 19. See also infra note 63 and accompany-
ing text.
32. Id. A construction lender expects a completed building as security for his loan. Gil-
more, supra note 11, at 1368-69. Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540, 545-46, 6 P.2d 952, 954
(1931) (conditional seller of heating and plumbing equipment knew the entire building was
security for the construction loan; his rights in the equipment had to yield to those of the
prior encumbrancer).
Construction loans generally are short-term financing arrangements. When the project
is completed, a long-term "take out" loan usually replaces the construction loan. H. DAVEY,
FINANCING REAL ESTATE IN CALIFORNIA 86 (1976). The "take out" may come from the
same lender, but usually comes from a different source. Id. The 1972 Code provides that a
refinancing of the original construction mortgage has priority over the fixture financer to the
1984]
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Finally, the 1962 version did not insure that fixture filings would
be made with the real estate records.33 A subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee would not find the perfected security interest when he
searched the real estate records. Nevertheless, the perfected fixture se-
curity interest prevailed.34
2. Why California rejected the 1962 version of section 9-313
California did not reject the 1962 version of section 9-313 because
it was satisfied with its existing fixture law.35 The courts took a case-
by-case approach which led to a lack of predictability in fixture law.
For example, the term "fixtures" was used not only to make factual
determinations, but also to describe the nature of legal relations be-
tween parties within the factual situations.36 The so-called California
"wall bed" cases illustrate the interrelationship between the factual and
legal determination of whether goods are fixtures.37
In Fisher v. Pennington ,38 a tenant was injured when the wall-bed
door fell on the bed. The landlord had a duty to provide his tenant
with "personalty" which was fit for its intended use. 39 Thus, in order to
place liability on the landlord, the court had to label the wall bed "per-
sonalty" rather than "fixture."4 In Southern California Hardwood and
same extent as the construction mortgage. U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972); see supra note 23.
Thus, if the fixture lender acquires a security interest after construction is completed, but
prior to the refinancing, the refinancing lender is still protected to the extent that the second
loan refinances the first.
33. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1962) provided that the fixture filing be made in the office where
the real estate records were kept. Recording officers read the 1962 version as meaning that
they were to maintain a separate recording system for fixture filings. Headrick, The New
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction and Critique, 34 MONT. L.
REV. 28, 46 (1973). Some filing officers "filed" the financing statements in desk drawers and
in shoe boxes. G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 818 (1965).
Thus, "[r]eal estate people had a legitimate kick [because] in many states there was no effort
to make sure that these fixture filings came to the attention of the real estate searcher."
Panel, supra note 20, at 986.
34. U.C.C. § 9-313 (1962). See supra note 19. Title companies also objected to the 1962
version. For example, the California Land Title Association believed that the 1962 version
would create secret liens on real property because a search of the realty records would not
disclose fixture liens recorded in a separate system. Note, Uniform Commercial Code Section
9-313: TimeforAdoption in California, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 235, 259, (1975) (citing Letter from
Robert D. Crawford (Chairman, California Land Title Association) to Sean E. McCarthy
(Assistant Legislative Counsel, California Land Title Association), March 18, 1974).
35. Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,435.
36. Horowitz, supra note 5, at 55.
37. See id.
38. 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931).
39. Id. at 250-51, 2 P.2d at 520.
40. Id. at 250, 2 P.2d at 519.
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Manufacturing Co. v. Borton,4 1 a conflict arose between the conditional
seller of wall beds and the real property owner's assignee for the benefit
of creditors. The Court of Appeal held that the assignee had no greater
rights in the property than did his assignor because the assignee was
not a purchaser for value.4z The California Supreme Court refused to
hear the case, but added its opinion to that of the Court of Appeal:
"These beds were not fixtures."'43 Thus, in these two cases, the legal
conclusions mandated that the wall beds be personalty and not realty.'
In two other cases, identical wall beds were classified as fixtures.
In Pacific Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Rosoff,45 after the real property
was encumbered with a construction mortgage, the conditional seller
sold wall beds to the owner of the realty. The priority dispute arose
between the mortgagee and the vendor.46 In Broadway Improvement &
Investment Co. v. Tumansky,47 the circumstances were reversed. The
mortgagor installed the fixtures and then gave a mortgage on the prop-
erty.48 In both cases the court sought to protect the party with an inter-
est in the real property, the mortgagee. The court could reach this
result only if the beds were part of the realty, i.e., fixtures. Therefore,
the desired legal conclusion required that the court classify the beds as
fixtures.
"Fixture," therefore, is not just a description; "fixture" is a result
which reflects a policy decision.49 In other words, application of the
label "fixture" merely means that the chattel has become part of the
real estate so that the real property claimant may prevail in a priority
dispute.50
Existing law had been soundly criticized by the State Bar Commit-
tee on the Uniform Commerical Code5' and by Professors Marsh and
Warren in their report to the Legislature. 52 The reasons for Califor-
nia's rejection were embedded within the 1962 version of section 9-313.
As explained by Professors Marsh and Warren:
41. 46 Cal. App. 524, 189 P. 1022 (1920).
42. Id. at 529-30, 189 P. at 1024-25.
43. Id. at 531, 189 P. at 1025.
44. Horowitz, supra note 5, at 55.
45. 20 Cal. App. 2d 383, 67 P.2d 110 (1937).
46. Id. at 384, 67 P.2d at 110.
47. 2 Cal. 2d 465, 41 P.2d 553 (1935).
48. Id. at 467, 41 P.2d at 553-54.
49. See Horowitz, supra note 5, at 55.
50. Kripke, supra note 1, at 45 (footnote omitted).
51. Uniform Commercial Code-Special Report by the Calffornia State Bar Committee on
the Commercial Code, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 119, 201 (1962).
52. Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,435.
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The scheme of this Section of the Code is that the law of the
State outside of the Code determines whether an object is a
"fixture" and this Section of the Code then supplies the legal
conclusion flowing from this classification. Any such bifurca-
tion of the existing law of fixtures is impossible, since what the
Code treats as two separate processes of judgment are all one
under existing law. In other words, what the Code asks the
judge to do is to decide in the abstract under "existing law"
whether an object is a "fixture", and the Code will then tell
him whether, for example, a subsequent mortgagee of the
land will prevail over the owner of an interest in the object
apart from the land. But under the only existing law that
there is, an answer to the first question answers the second
also; and the answer might very well be different if the legal
problem presented were different.
It would probably be a great advance in the law if the
law of fixtures could be codified and separated into two dis-
tinct problems: A factual classification of an object as a "fix-
ture", which is recognized as something different both from
"realty" and "personalty", and, secondly, a statement of the
legal results in various circumstances which follow from such
a classification. It is impossible, however, to do only half of
this job without making a greater mess than there was before.
We agree with the criticism that this Section would only "add
to the confusion" of the California law of fixtures (which is
not unique in that regard.)53
3. California's first "solution" to the fixture "mess"
California adopted the 1962 Uniform Commercial Code in 1963," 4
but did not adopt section 9-313.11 Instead, the Legislature drafted
around the absence of a fixture provision by adding subsection (1)(c) to
subdivision 9102 of the California Uniform Commercial Code which
provided that real estate law would control when a dispute arose be-
tween a fixture secured creditor and a third party with an interest in the
real property.56 Thus, the Legislature decided that Article 9 should not
53. Id. at 19,437.
54. 1963 Cal. Stat. ch. 819.
55. See supra note 22.
56. Section 9102(l)(c) provided that division 9 applied:
To any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security
interest in goods which are or later become "fixtures" under the law of this state,
but as against third parties having or acquiring an interest in or a lien on the real
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apply in such circumstances. Nevertheless, confusion continued to
reign in the California law of fixtures.5 7
B. California Postponed a Decision on the 1972 Version
1. The 1972 version ameliorated some of the problems
Ten years later, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
presented a revised version of section 9-313.58 They deleted the re-
quirement that the goods must be preclassified as fixtures according to
state law before the Code would determine priorities.5 9 The 1972 ver-
sion provides that "goods are fixtures when they become so related to
particular real estate that an interest in them arises under real estate
law."6 The California Committee on section 9-313 of the UCC inter-
preted the revised version as permitting consideration of the impact of
the Code in determining whether goods are fixtures. 61 No preliminary,
independent classification of fixture/non-fixture must be made. All
that is necessary is that a conffict of interest arise between the secured
party and a real property interest in order to trigger the priority scheme
of section 9-313. In other words, "[t]he mere existence of the interest in
the goods incident to the real estate interest mean[s] that an interest
[arises] under 'real estate law.' "62 Thus, theoretically at least, the 1972
version is an improvement in the sense that no precise definition or
preclassification of fixtures is needed to enable the creditor to benefit
from the priority system of section 9-313. Yet, as the following discus-
sion will show, the secured creditor still cannot benefit from the Code's
priority system if he misclassifies the goods. The 1972 version of sec-
tion 9-313 also protects construction lenders63 and provides for the ill-
property, the rights and duties of the parties to the secured transaction are gov-
erned by the law of this state relating to real property and fixtures.
CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(l)(c) (West 1964).
Note that in California, "Article 9" becomes "Division 9," and Article 9 "subsections"
become "subdivisions." For simplicity, this Comment will use the words "Article" and
"subsection" throughout. California has also deleted the dash in the numbering system.
Thus, U.C.C. § 9-102 becomes § 9102 in California. The dash will be omitted when refer-
ring to the California statute.
57. See, e.g., Goldie v. Bauchet Properties, 15 Cal. 3d 307, 540 P.2d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161
(1975); see infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of Goldie.
58. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
59. U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(a) (1972). See supra note 23.
60. Id.
61. Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,436.
62. Id. at 19,456.
63. U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972), supra note 23.
Even without this revision, some courts had begun to adopt odd methods in order to
protect the construction lender. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Detroit Federal Savings
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ing of financing statements with the real estate records thus curing two
of the 1962 flaws.6 4
2. The 1972 version does not correct the problem of perfection
where the exact character of the collateral is not certain
Although the California Commission for section 9-313 interpreted
the 1972 version as not requiring a separate fixture preclassification ac-
cording to state law in order to trigger the priority scheme,65 in reality
the secured creditor often must do exactly that. In states using the 1972
version of section 9-313, this problem arises because the secured credi-
tor must determine (i.e., guess) whether the collateral is or will become
& Loan Ass'n, 79 Mich. App. 378, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 494 (1977). In a classic example of
fuzzy reasoning, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that "the goods secured were
inventory within the meaning of§ 9-109." 79 Mich. App. at 383-84, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at
498.
Inventory refers to goods which are held for sale in the ordinary course of business. Id.
at 383, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 497. The court failed to distinguish the sale of a completed
condominium from the sale of appliances and carpeting in the ordinary course of business.
Surely, the ordinary course of business for this builder was the sale of condominiums and
not the sale of carpeting. The court further stated: "The code implies that materials and
goods consumed or used in business are inventory." Id., 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 497-98.
See also U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 4 (1972).
It is difficult to see how appliances and carpets are "used up" in this context. Neverthe-
less, Sears' failure to comply with section 9-312(3) "doom[ed] plaintiffs claim to any priority
under the code." Id. at 386, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 499.
If the builder wishes to obtain better financing for the fixtures needed for his project, he
can get consent from his construction lender. U.C.C. § 9-313(5)(a) (1972), supra note 23.
Thus, notwithstanding the protection given to the construction lender in section 9-313(6), he
can waive that protection under subsection (6). This has the effect of subordinating the
construction loan to the loan of the fixture financer. If it were to be uniformly held that
fixture lenders were junior to construction lenders, one might expect that no fixture lender
would agree to lend for new construction in the absence of a subordination agreement from
construction lenders.
64. U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1972). Subsection (5) provides in pertinent part:
A financing statement. . . filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313). . .must show
that it covers this type of collateral, must recite that it is to be filed [for record] in
the real estate records, and the financing statement must contain a description of
the real estate. . . . If the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real
estate, the financing statement must show the name of a record owner.
U.C.C. § 9-403(7) (1972) insures that the filing officer will know where to file the financing
statement. Subsection (7) provides in pertinent part:
When a financing statement . . . is filed as a fixture filing, [it shall be filed for
record and] the filing officer shall index it under the names of the debtor and any
owner of record shown on the financing statement in the same fashion as if they
were the mortgagors in a mortgage of the real estate described, and, to the extent
that the law of this state provides for indexing of mortgages under the name of the
mortgagee, under the name of the secured party as if he were the mortgagee there-
under, or where indexing is by description in the same fashion as if the financing
statement were a mortgage of the real estate described.
65. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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fixtures before he can determine where to perfect his security interest.
If the goods are personal property, the creditor perfects his interest by
filing his financing statement with the Secretary of State.66 If the goods
66. U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972). In § 9-401, the UCC drafters provided the states with three
alternatives:
First Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or
when the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313)
and the collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures, then in
the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded;
(b) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State].
Second Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations, or farm
products, or accounts or general intangibles arising from or relating to
the sale of farm products by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the
office of the ........ .in the county of the debtor's residence or if the
debtor is not a resident of this state then in the office of the .........
in the county where the goods are kept, and in addition when the collat-
eral is crops growing or to be grown in the office of the ........ .in
the county where the land is located;
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or
when the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313)
and the collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures, then in
the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State].
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations, or farm
products, or accounts or general intangibles arising from or relating to
the sale of farm products by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the
office of the ...... .in the county of the debtor's residence or if the
debtor is not a resident of this state then in the office of the ...... in
the county where the goods are kept, and in addition when the collateral
is crops growing or to be grown in the office of the ...... .in the
county where the land is located;
(b) when the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (includ-
ing oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103,
or when the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-
313) and the collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures, then
in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or
recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State] and in addition,
if the debtor has a place of business in only one county of this state, also
in the office of ...... of such county, or, if the debtor has no place of
business in this state, but resides in the state, also in the office of ......
of the county in which he resides.
Note: One of the three alternatives should be selected as subsection (1).
A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in all of the places
required by this section is nevertheless effective with regard to any collateral as to
which the filing complied with the requirements of this Article and is also effective
with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against any person
who has knowledge of the contents of such financing statement.
(3) A filing which is made in the proper place in this state continues effective
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are fixtures, the creditor perfects his interest locally by filing the financ-
ing statement with the real estate records.67 Only if the secured creditor
makes the correct choice and perfects his interest in the proper place
can he be assured of priority when a dispute arises.
The modified version therefore leaves a major problem un-
resolved: the fixture financer who filed his financing statement in the
wrong office is vulnerable to attack from the bankruptcy trustee and a
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee.68 He needs to determine whether
the collateral is a fixture before he can know where to perfect. Thus,
the definition problem remains; 69 the structure of the analysis shifts,
but the substantive dilemma remains.
3. California hesitated to adopt the 1972 version
The reasons for the omission of revised section 9-313 from the ma-
jor code revision undertaken by the California Legislature in 1974 are
less clear than those behind the State's rejection of the 1962 version.
Although the 1972 version of section 9-313 was included in the original
bill, the bill was passed in 1974 without the fixtures provision. 70 Ap-
parently the fixtures provision was stricken at the request of title com-
panies who wanted additional time to study the proposed legislation.71
even though the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collat-
eral or its use, whichever controlled the original filing, is thereafter changed.
Alternative subsection (3)
[(3) A filing which is made in the proper county continues effective for four
months after a change to another county of the debtor's residence or place of busi-
ness or the location of the collateral, whichever controlled the original filing. It
becomes ineffective thereafter unless a copy of the financing statement signed by
the secured party is filed in the new county within said period. The security inter-
est may also be perfected in the new county after the expiration of the four-month
period; in such case perfection dates from the time of perfection in the new county.
A change in the use of the collateral does not impair the effectiveness of the origi-
nal filing.]
(4) The rules stated in Section 9-103 determine whether filing is necessary
in this state.
(5) Notwithstanding the preceeding subsections, and subject to subsection
(3) of Section 9-302, the proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest
in collateral, including fixtures, of a transmitting utility is the office of the [Secre-
tary of State]. This filing constitutes a fixture filing (Section 9-313) as to the col-
lateral described therein which is or is to become fixtures.
(6) For the purposes of this section, the residence of an organization is its
place of business if it has one or its chief executive office if it has more than one
place of business.
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 117-45 & 159-74 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text.
70. Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,437.
71. Id.
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What was needed was a push in the direction of section 9-313 in order
to bring order to the chaos which existed in California fixture law.
C. The Propelling Force Toward Adoption of
Section 9-313 in California
The propelling force behind the California decision to adopt some
form of section 9-313 was the case of Goldie v. Bauchet Properties.72 An
analysis of Goldie will illustrate one of the chaotic and confused tangles
in California fixture law.
1. The California Supreme Court's confusion was apparent in
Goldie v. Bauchet Properties
a. the factual conflict
In Goldie, an automatic food packaging machine was affixed to
real property. In a sale and lease-back arrangement, the owners of the
machine and real property conveyed the real property to Bauchet
Properties. Under an unrecorded lease, the seller/lessee gave Bauchet
a security interest in the machine to protect the lessor against default by
the lessee. The lessee, who to all outward appearances owned the
machine, proceeded to borrow money from Goldie. He gave Goldie a
note and security interest in the machine. Goldie perfected his security
interest by filing his security agreement with the Secretary of State, ap-
parently in accordance with section 9401(l)(c) of the California Uni-
form Commercial Code.73 When the lessee defaulted on the lease and
note, Goldie demanded possession of the machine. The lessor refused
and Goldie sued.74
b. the legal conflict
Goldie argued that the machine was a trade fixture and, as such,
was personal property.75 Since personal property interests are covered
72. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 540 P.2d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1975). In the same year a Note was
published which correctly described the California law of fixtures as being "in a state of
chaos." Final Report at 19,436 (citing Note, Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-313: Time
for Adoption in Calfornia, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 235, 240 (1975)).
73. CAL. COM. CODE § 9401(1)(c) (West Supp. 1984). This section states in pertinent
part that "[t]he proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is. . . in the office of
the Secretary of State." The Legislature did not change this provision in 1980 when it
adopted its version of § 9313. See infra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
74. 15 Cal. 3d at 312, 540 P.2d at 4-5, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
75. Goldie could have been relying on the California trade fixtures statute which
provides:
A tenant may remove from the demised premises, any time during the continuance
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by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, he argued that his per-
fected security interest should prevail over the holder of an unrecorded
lease.76 The trial court agreed."
Bauchet Properties argued that it had a superior right to the
machine because the parties' rights were governed by landlord-tenant
law which remained unchanged by adoption of the Code.78
c. the flaws in the court's analysis
On appeal, the California Supreme Court was faced with two is-
sues: (1) whether trade fixtures are included within the classification of
personal property under the Code and (2) whether the lessor had a su-
perior claim to the machine arising from its interest in the real prop-
erty. The court agreed with the trial court on the first issue stating that:
"[I]n the instant case the trial court quite logically determined that
'trade fixtures' are 'personal property' within the meaning of the Cali-
fornia Uniform Commercial Code.' 79 It appears, therefore, for pur-
poses of the Code, a trade fixture is personal property and is to be
treated no differently than any other fixture. 0
of his term, anything affixed thereto for purposes of trade, manufacture, ornament,
or domestic use, if the removal can be effected without injury to the premises,
unless the thing has, by the manner in which it is affixed, become an integral part
of the premises.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1019 (West 1982). Section 1019 is an exception to § 1013 which provides:
"When a person affixes his property to the land of another,. . . the thing affixed. . . be-
longs to the owner of the land," unless there is a contrary agreement. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1013 (West 1982).
76. 15 Cal. 3d at 314, 540 P.2d at 6, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
77. Id. at 312, 540 P.2d at 5, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
78. Id. Under landlord-tenant law, lease provisions giving the landlord the tenant's
property upon the tenant's breach of the lease are valid. Id. at 313, 540 P.2d at 6, 124 Cal.
Rptr. at 166 (citing Bridges v. Cal-Pacific Leasing Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 118, 128, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 801 (1971)).
Section 9-102 defines the scope of Article 9. UCC § 9-102(l)(a) provides: "Except as
otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article applies to any
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal
property or fixtures . ..."
When the Goldie opinion was written, "fixtures" were not included in the California
version of the same section. CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(l)(a) (West 1964). The word "fix-
tures" was added to § 9102(l)(a) when § 9313 was enacted in California. Final Report,
supra note 22, at 19,438. Subsection (1)(a) of § 9102 now provides: "Except as otherwise
provided in Section 9104 on excluded transactions, this division applies. . .[t]o any trans-
action (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal
property, or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel
paper or accounts. . . ." CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(l)(a) (West Supp. 1984).
79. 15 Cal. 3d at 316, 540 P.2d at 8, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
80. For an extended analysis of trade fixtures within the context of Goldie v. Bauchet
Properties, see Note, Treatment of Trade Fixtures Under the California Commercial Code, 65
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With respect to the second question, the Goldie court made a con-
fused attempt to unravel the fixture tangle which was created in part by
the California Legislature's failure to adopt UCC section 9-313. In ef-
fect, the Legislature had drafted around the gap created by the absence
of section 9-313 by modifying section 9102(l)(a) which defined the
scope of Article 9.11 The Uniform version of section 9-102(1)(a) in-
cludes "fixtures. ' 2 The California Legislature deleted "fixtures" from
this section and added a nonuniform provision, section 9102(l)(c),
which stated that real estate law would govern disputes between a fix-
tures secured creditor and a party with an interest in the real prop-
erty.13  Thus, section 9102(l)(c) explicitly excluded from Article 9
claims based upon interests in real property.84
The Goldie court, construing the California legislative intent be-
hind sections 9102(1)(a) and 9102(l)(c), stated that the Legislature
"made it clear that its purpose in so doing was to immunize from the
reach of the California Uniform Commercial Code the rights of hold-
ers of interests not only in real property but thereby also in property
affixed to it."8" But the court already had determined that trade fix-
tures were personal property and not fixtures.86 Faced with this di-
lemma, the court concluded that "[t]he Legislature apparenty
overlooked the fact that the rights of holders of interests in real prop-
erty and thereby to property affixed to it, might be affected by security
interests in 'personal property' falling within section 9102, subdivision
(1), subsection (a)."
87
The court closed the gap by interpreting the term "fixtures" in sub-
division (1), subsection (a), "to mean goods affixed to real property re-
gardless of whether as a result of their classification under the law of
fixtures the affixed goods are treated as 'personalty' or 'realty.' "88
Thus, where there were competing claims in goods which were "af-
fixed," the Code did not apply and priorities were to be established
under real property law.
89
If the court had ended its analysis at that point, the result would
CAL. L. REV. 367 (1977). But see In re Factory Homes Corp., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1300
(W.D. Ark. 1971) (trade fixtures are equipment and not fixtures).
81. See supra note 78.
82. Id.
83. CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(I)(a) (West Supp. 1984), supra note 78.
84. Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,438.
* 85. 15 Cal. 3d at 317, 540 P.2d at 8, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
86. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
87. 15 Cal. 3d at 317, 540 P.2d at 9, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 317-18, 540 P.2d at 9, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
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have been that the California Code simply could not be applied where
there were competing interests in personal property which had been
"affixed" to real property. The court, however, continued its analysis.
If the lessor's interest was "derivative" from its interest in the real prop-
erty,90 and the tenant lost his right to remove the machine, the chattel
mortgagee, Goldie, could not remove the machine either.9' But, if
Bauchet Properties' interest in the machine was not derivative, it could
be a security interest under the lease, in which case the Code would
apply.92 The court did not explain how a security interest under the
lease could arise in light of its earlier determination that the California
Legislature intended to insulate from the Code the rights of holders of
real property in the property affixed to it.93 The machine was "affixed;"
it was bolted to the floor.94 Nevertheless, the Goldie court remanded
90. The "rights of the chattel mortgagee are derivative. He cannot assert a greater right
against the lessor than can the lessees." Id. at 313, 540 P.2d at 6, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 166
(quoting Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 281, 309 P.2d 451, 454 (1957)).
The Rinaldi court borrowed the principle of derivative rights in real property from the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington. In Donahue v. Hardman Estate, 91 Wash. 125,
128, 157 P. 478, 480 (1916), the court held: "A mortgagee from a tenant has no greater right
to remove trade fixtures from the premises after the tenant has surrendered possession to the
landlord than the tenant himself would have."
91. 15 Cal. 3d at 313, 540 P.2d at 6, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
92. Of interest is why the Goldie court ignored California Uniform Commercial Code
§ 9104(j). See Note, Goldie v. Bauchet P'roperties- California Uniform Commercial Code:
Division Nine's Application to Ownershp Interests in Trade Fixtures Acquired Under a Real
Property Lease, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 377 (1976).
When Goldie was decided, subsection (j) of § 9104 provided that Article 9 did not apply
"[t]o the creation of transfer or an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents
thereunder." CAL. COM. CODE § 91040) (West 1964). If the court had applied § 9104(j), it
could have avoided its entire analysis of both trade fixtures and the Commerical Code. Sim-
ply put, because Bauchet's interest arose through a lease, Article 9 was totally irrelevant to
the determination of priority in the collateral. Real property law would have governed by
default. By holding that Article 9 does not apply to conflicts between a landlord whose
interest in his tenant's trade fixtures is derived from his ownership interest in the real prop-
erty and a secured creditor with an interest in the trade fixture, the court reached the same
result as if it had applied § 91040). The tortured analysis of derivative interests versus se-
curity interests under the Code would have been unnecessary because § 91040) excluded
security interest created under a lease from Article 9. If the court had found that Bauchet's
lease created a security interest, this would have been in direct conflict with § 91040); it is
not possible to have a Code protected interest under a lease. 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. at 384
n.40. The court, unwittingly perhaps, merged its conclusion with that required by § 91040).
This undercuts the vitality of Goldie because § 91040) excludes the entire issue.
After 1980, § 9104(j) provided: "This division does not apply. . . except to the extent
that provision is made for fixtures in Section 9313, to the creation or transfer of an interest in
or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder and to any interest of a lessor and
lessee in any such lease or rents." CAL. COM. CODE § 91040) (West Supp. 1984).
93. 15 Cal. 3d at 318, 540 P.2d at 9, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
94. Id. at 311, 540 P.2d at 4, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
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for a determination of the nature of Bauchet Properties' interest: deriv-
ative from its real estate interest or a security interest created under the
lease.
95
2. The aftermath of Goldie
After Goldie, fixture lenders could not predict which way the law
would move. Would secret liens created by landlord and tenant in un-
recorded leases be construed as the landlord's right derived from his
real property interest? If so, no fixture lender would feel secure about
lending on a tenant's chattel. Would the secret lien be construed as a
security interest created under a lease? Only then would the code pro-
tect a chattel lender.
In Goldie, the dispute arose over a fixture-in-place. A lender who
accepts fixtures-in-place as collateral will extend credit only if he can
be assured of protection against secret leases which grant a security
interest in the same collateral. This would have a negative effect on the
tenant. His trade fixtures may be his only source of collateral. Credit
may be necessary for the successful operation of his business. If secret
liens are permitted, through rights derived from real estate law, the ten-
ant is excluded from the credit market. The insecure fixture financier
will not extend credit. This in turn may cause the tenant (and hence his
landlord) economic hardship. On the other hand, a knowledgeable
lender could convince an unsophisticated landlord to subordinate his
interest.96 This also could cause the landlord economic hardship.
The Goldie decision did not jeopardize the priority of a fixture
lender who takes a security interest in goods before they become fix-
tures. For example, if a tenant purchases goods on conditional sale, the
vendor perfects his interest, and then the tenant affixes the goods to the
landlord's property, the landlord cannot prevail against the secured
creditor unless his tenant could prevail.97 Thus, if the tenant defaults
on his lease and security agreement, the secured creditor has priority in
the goods. This makes sense because the landlord did not rely on those
goods as security when the lease was created.
Thus, if Goldie had taken a security interest in the packaging
machine and perfected his interest before the tenant bolted the machine
to the floor, no reservation under Bauchet Properties' lease could have
defeated Goldie's priority in the machine.
95. Id. at 318-19, 540 P.2d at 10-11, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
96. See supra note 63.
97. 15 Cal. 3d at 313-14 n.5, 540 P.2d at 6 n.5, 124 Cal. Rptr. 166 n.5 and cases cited
therein.
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3. Summary of the law after Goldie
After Goldie, the secured creditor knew that trade fixtures were
personal property for purposes of the Code. Legislative intent was con-
strued as excluding the secured creditor's interest in anything "affixed"
to realty from the protection of the Code. Maybe a secret lien under a
lease defeated a secured creditor's interest because the landlord's inter-
est was "derived" from his real property interest. On the other hand,
the landlord's lease could have created a security interest. If so, prior-
ity in the collateral was governed by the Code. Fixture lenders had
every right to be concerned, as did tenants in need of credit. Clearly, it
was time for the California Legislature to step in and clear up the
confusion.
III. CALIFORNIA MODIFIED SECTION 9-313
By 1975, California decisional fixture law had been characterized
as being "in a state of chaos."98 In 1980, the California Legislature
enacted a nonuniform version of section 9-313 of the UCC and its re-
lated sections.9 9 This section will outline the modifications to the Uni-
98. Note, Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-313: Timefor Adoption in California, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 235, 240 (1975).
99. See supra note 26. California Uniform Commercial Code § 9313 provides:
(1) In this section and in the provisions of Chapter 4 (commencing with Sec-
tion 9401) referring to fixture filing, unless the context otherwise requires
(a) Goods are "fixtures" when they become so related to particular real es-
tate that an interest in them arises under real estate law.
(b) A "fixture filing" is the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate would be recorded of a financing statement covering goods which are or are
to become fixtures and conforming to the requirements of subdivision (5) of Sec-
tion 9402.
(c) A mortgage is a "construction mortgage" to the extent that it secures an
obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land including the
acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates.
(2) A security interest under this division may be created in goods which are
fixtures or may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no security interest
exists under this division in ordinary building materials incorporated into an im-
provement on land.
(3) This division does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures
pursuant to real estate law.
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting
interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) The security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, a fixture filing
covering the fixtures is filed before the goods become fixtures or within 10 days
thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in posses-
sion of the real estate; or
(b) A fixture filing covering the fixtures is filed before the interest of the en-
cumbrancer or owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any con-
flicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the
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form Code made by the California Legislature. An analysis of the
California section 9313 in its entirety is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment."°° The primary focus will be on the California scheme for
perfection found in section 9401 and the interaction between that
perfection and subdivision (4) of section 9313.
A. The Caliornia modtcations
The Legislature adopted subsections (1)-(3) of Uniform section 9-
313 with little change. A parenthetical, however, has been added to
subsection (1). Section 9313(1) begins: "In this section and in the pro-
visions of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 9401) referring to fix-
ture filing . . ... 10 This seemingly minor addition is significant. It
instantly alerts the practitioner that the proper place to begin analysis is
not with section 9313, but with section 9401.
debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real
estate; or
(c) The fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines or readily
removable replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods; or
(d) The conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or
equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method per-
mitted by this division.
(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over
the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) The encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the security in-
terest or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(b) The debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer
or owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the priority of the security interest con-
tinues for a reasonable time.
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subdivision (4) but otherwise subject
to subdivisions (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a con-
struction mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become
fixtures before the completion of the construction. To the extent that it is given to
refinance a construction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent
as the construction mortgage.
(7) In the cases not within the preceeding subdivisions, a security interest in
fixtures is subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of
the related real estate who is not the debtor.
(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encumbrancers
of the real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Chapter 5 (com-
mencing with Section 9501), remove his collateral from the real estate but he must
reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and
who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not
for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods
removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A'person entitled to reimburse-
ment may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate se-
curity for the performance of this obligation.
100. See Bayer, Calfornia's New Law of Fixtures: Section 9313 o/the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 60 (1981) for an analysis from a practitioner's point of view.
101. CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(l) (West Supp. 1984), supra note 99.
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1. Section 9401
There are two reasons for the parenthetical addition. In order to
understand the first, it is necessary to compare the method and place of
perfection under the Uniform Code with that provided in the Califor-
nia Code. The Uniform version offers three alternative choices of sub-
section (1) of section 9-401.1°2 In all three, the proper place to file in
order to perfect a security interest in goods which are or will become
fixtures is where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or re-
corded." 3 That "fixture" language is missing from the California ver-
sion of section 9401(l).' ° Thus, the only possible construction of
section 9401 in California is that the proper place to file in order to
perfect a security interest is in the office of the Secretary of State.'05 In
other words, in California, a security interest in fixtures can only be
perfected by filing a financing statement with the Secretary of State,
whereas, under the Uniform version, a security interest in fixtures can
102. See supra note 66.
103. Id.
104. CAL. COM. CODE § 9401(1) (West Supp. 1984). Section 9401 provides:
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) When the collateral is consumer goods, then in the office of the county
recorder in the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a resident of
this state, then in the office of county recorder of the county in which the goods are
kept;
(b) When the collateral is crops growing or to be grown, timber to be cut or
is minerals or the like (including oil and gas) or accounts subject to subdivision (5)
of Section 9103, then in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be
recorded.
(c) In all other cases, in the office of the Secretary of State.
(2) A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in all of
the places required by this section is nevertheless effective with regard to any col-
lateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements of this division and is
also effective with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against
any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing statement.
(3) A filing which is made in the proper place in this state continues effective
even though the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collat-
eral or its use, whichever controlled the original filing, is thereafter changed.
(4) The rules stated in Section 9103 determine whether filing is necessary in
this state.
(5) Notwithstanding subdivision (1), and subject to subdivision (3) of Section
9302, the proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest in collateral,
including fixtures, of a transmitting utility is the office of the Secretary of State.
This filing also constitutes a fixture filing (Section 9313) as to the collateral de-
scribed therein which is or to become fixtures.
(6) For the purposes of this section, the residence of an organization is its
place of business if it has one or its chief executive office if it has more than one
place of business.
(7) The proper place to file a financing statement filed as a fixture filing is in
the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be recorded.
105. Id. The USCA provided a uniform set of perfection rules. One of the UCC drafters,
Professor Kripke, preferred this approach. Kripke, supra note 1, at 57.
ARTICLE 9 AND FIXTURES
only be perfected by a filing in the local office with the real estate
records. 
06
The second reason for the parenthetical in subsection (1) of the
California section 9313 is the addition of subsection (7) to section 9401:
"The proper place to file a financing statement filed as a fixture filing is
in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be recorded."' 10 7
This subsection is not part of the Uniform Code. California thus has
severed the concept of "perfection" of a fixture security interest from
the concept of a fixture "filing."' l08 In other words, all security interests
are perfected with the Secretary of State; all fixture financing state-
ments are filed with the real estate records. A fixture filing with the real
estate records never perfects the security interest and the interest must
be perfected before the local filing is effective against real estate
interests.
2. Section 9313
The major change to this section is the effect of the perfection
modifications in section 9401. It is section 9401, acting upon section
9313, that makes section 9313 a radical departure from the Uniform
version. Thus, the word "perfection" has been changed to "filed" in
California's section 9313(4)(a),(b). 10 9
The Legislature made two additional changes to Uniform section
9-313(4)(c)." 0 Under the Uniform version, a perfected security interest
in readily removable factory or office machines, or readily removable
replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods, has
priority if "before the goods become fixtures the security interest is per-
fected by any method permitted by this Article.""' In California, this
106. Depending on whether Article 9 applies at all, and on the nature of the collateral,
filing may not be required for perfection: "A security interest is perfected when it has at-
tached and when all the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken .. "
U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1972); CAL. COM. CODE § 9303(1) (West Supp. 1984). Filing is not re-
quired to perfect an interest in certain types of goods. For example, no filing is required in
order to perfect a security interest in consumer goods. See generally U.C.C. § 9-302 (1972);
CAL. COM. CODE § 9302 (West Supp. 1984).
107. CAL. COM. CODE § 9401(7), supra note 104.
108. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. Professor Kripke first "suggested that the
terms 'filing' and 'perfection' not be used with connection with the procedure in the real
estate records." Kripke, supra note 1, at 60. He further suggested that this procedure be
called "real estate notification." Id. California, however, does not refer to the real estate
filing as a notification.
109. CAL. COM. CODE § 9-313(4)(a), (b), supra note 99.
110. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(c) (1972), supra note 23.
111. Id.
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
entire phrase has been deleted.'
1 2
The deletion of the phrase does two things. First, in California, a
secured creditor with goods of the type described in section 9313(4)(c)
cannot perfect by "any method." The creditor is bound by the perfec-
tion method determined by section 9401, that is, he must perfect his
interest by filing a financing statement with the Secretary of State." 3
Second, under the Uniform provision, the creditor must perfect his se-
curity interest before the goods become fixtures.'1 4 The California
Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code deleted the reference to
time because, as a policy matter, security interests in goods of this type
"should prevail over adverse real estate interests regardless of the time
of perfection.""' 5 There will, therefore, be no disputes over whether
goods of this type are or are not fixtures. The holder of a perfected
security interest will always prevail. Any dispute probably will center
around exactly what are "readily removable" office machines and
"replacements" of domestic appliances," 16 and these are fringe disputes
of a much lower commercial voltage than the fixture ambiguity.
The remainder of the language in section 9313 is substantially the
same as the language in the Uniform version.
B. Advantages of the Calfornia Approach over the Uniform Version
in Bankruptcy Proceedings Where the Trustee is a
Hypothetical Lien Creditor
This section will explain why the California Code provisions relat-
ing to fixtures are an improvement over the Uniform Code's provisions
with respect to the bankruptcy trustee's status as a hypothetical lien
creditor.
1. The "acid test"
The "acid test" of a security interest is whether it will withstand an
attack by the bankruptcy trustee.' In 1974, the UCC drafters pre-
112. CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(4)(c), supra note 99.
113. CAL. COM. CODE § 9401. See also Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,437 (citing
Marsh and Warren Report, supra note 29).
114. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(c) (1972), note 23.
115. Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,444.
116. Headrick, The New Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction
and Critique, 34 MONT. L. REV. 28, 46-47 (1973).
117. R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 7-3 at 258 (2d ed. 1979); Del Gaudio; Artiele 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 12 TOL. L. REV. 305, 306 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Del Gaudio].
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dicted that "[i]f the new bankruptcy act were adopted, one could pro-
tect a fixture security interest by any sort of perfection which is proper
under the Code.""'  The new Bankruptcy Act was enacted by Con-
gress and signed into law by the President in 1978.t"9 Section 544(a)(1)
of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the status of a hypothetical
lien creditor from the date of the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceedings. 2  Under section 544(a), the trustee's powers are those
which state law' 2 ' would give to a creditor of the debtor who had per-
fected a lien upon all the property available for satisfaction of his claim
against the debtor. 122 In order to survive an attack by the trustee as a
lien creditor, it appears from the language of section 544(a)(1) that the
secured creditor need only file his financing statement somewhere-
anywhere-that a state permits in order to perfect his interest prior to
the commencement of the proceedings. The secured creditor should be
able to perfect by filing his financing statement with the Secretary of
State, with the real estate records, or without making any filing at all.'23
a. state law should protect the perfected secured creditor
If the secured creditor complies with state law, he should be safe
from the trustee's attack because the trustee's powers under section
544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code are derived from state law.1 24  Sec-
tion 9301(l)(b) of the California Uniform Commercial Code, one
source of the trustee's power,125 governs the rights of lien creditors.'
26
118. Panel, supra note 20, at 984.
119. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. (1982).
120. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982). This section provides:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard to
any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable by . . . a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the
time of the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple
contract could have obtained a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.
121. A more accurate expression here would be nonbankruptcy law. In all but a small
proportion of bankruptcies, nonbankruptcy law is state law. However, in the District of
Columbia or in a territory, some federal law would govern. State law as used herein in-
cludes federal law which applies in these limited situations. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 544.02 at 544-5 n.3 (15th ed. 1983).
122. State law determines whether a security interest is perfected. See, e.g., In re Inde-
pendence Land Title Corp., 4 C.B.C.2d 118 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (perfection of security
interest controlled by Illinois law); In re Smith, 10 Bankr. 883 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (perfection
of security interest controlled by Georgia law).
123. See supra note 106.
124. Del Gaudio, supra note 117, at 321.
125. Id.
126. CAL. COM. CODE § 9301(l)(b) provides: "[A]n unperfected security interest is
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Section 544(a)(1) does not grant the trustee greater rights than those
granted by state law to a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable
proceedings.
1 27
Section 9301(l)(b) provides that an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor
before the security interest is perfected.128 Therefore, a perfected secur-
ity interest retains priority over a subsequent lien creditor. The bank-
ruptcy trustee is deemed to be a lien creditor.129  If California
Commercial Code section 9301(l)(b) is read with section 9313(4)(d), an
even stronger case is made for the priority of a fixtures creditor who
perfects by filing with the Secretary of State over the trustee as lien
creditor. Section 9313(4)(d) provides that a perfected security interest
in fixtures takes priority where the conflicting interest is a subsequent
lien on the real estate obtained by legal or equitable proceedings.,3"
The drafters of the UCC adopted the phrase "lien by legal or equitable
proceedings" from former section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act.' 3 ' They
intended UCC section 9-313(4)(d) to encompass all liens on the real
property obtained by legal or equitable proceedings.132 Substantive
state law under section 9313, therefore, also should protect the earlier
perfected security interest.
The drafters view subsection 9-313(4)(d) as a "bastard kind of
perfection."'' 33 "We say that any sort of filing is good as against the lien
subordinate to the rights of. . .[a] person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected." This version is identical to the Uniform version.
127. COLLIER, supra note 121, at 544-10.
128. See supra note 126.
129. CAL. COM. CODE § 9301(3) provides in pertinent part: "A 'lien creditor' means a
creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like
.... and includes. . . a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or
a receiver in equity from the time of appointment." This is identical to the Uniform version.
130. CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(4)(d), supra note 99; U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(d) (1972), supra
note 23.
131. U.C.C. § 9-313 comment 4c (1972). Section 70c provided in pertinent part:
The trustee shall have as of the date of the bankruptcy the rights and powers of
a creditor who upon the date of the bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or
equitable proceedings upon all property. . . upon which a creditor of the bank-
rupt upon a simple contract could have obtained such a lien ....
4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70 at 4 (14th ed. 1979). This so-called "strong arm clause"
is now § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. See supra note 120. Although the language "lien
by legal or equitable proceedings" did not survive, it was the intent of Congress that § 544(a)
have the same effect as former § 70c. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1977); S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 5787, 6326 & 5871.
132. U.C.C. § 9-313 comment 4c (1972).
133. Panel, supra note 23, at 984.
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creditor and, therefore, against the trustee in bankruptcy."13 4 If that
were true in the real world, a secured creditor who errs when he guesses
"fixture" and perfects locally rather than with the Secretary of State
should have a perfected interest as against a lien creditor or the bank-
ruptcy trustee. This should be true even if a court later holds that the
secured creditor's collateral is not a fixture. Conversely, a secured
creditor who decides the goods are personalty and files with the Secre-
tary of State should be perfected if a court later decides that his collat-
eral is a fixture.
b. the secured creditor loses under the Uniform Code'sperfection
requirements
Unfortunately, bankruptcy courts have not seen eye-to-eye with
the drafters. A sampling of recent bankruptcy cases indicates that a
"wrong guess" which leads a "secured" creditor down the path to the
wrong filing office also leads him to the depths of unsecured creditor
status. For example, in In re Belmont Industries,"35 a dispute arose be-
tween the bankruptcy trustee and a secured creditor. The court
phrased the issue as "whether the defendant filed its financing state-
ment in the correct place."' 136 The collateral was a boiler and machines
connected to the realty by means of air or steam pipes. The court held
that the machines were not fixtures. The trustee was able to set aside
the creditor's interest in the machines because "defendant failed to per-
fect its security interest in the equipment because it filed its financing
statement locally rather than with the Secretary of State."' 137 The
boiler, however, was held to be a fixture. Therefore, the secured credi-
tor retained his priority because he had guessed correctly as to the na-
ture of the boiler and filed his financing statement locally.
138
In another case, conditional sellers of a mobile home filed their
financing statement according to the provisions of UCC section 9-
302(l)(d) because they considered the mobile home to be a "motor ve-
hicle."' 139 The bankrupt affixed the vehicle to her land. The trustee
successfully claimed that the mobile home became a fixture when it
was affixed to the realty. The court reduced the conditional sellers to
134. Id. "[Tihere is no requirement that as' against a judgment lien or of the real estate,
the prior filing of the fixture security interest must be in the real estate records." See supra
note 132.
135. 1 Bankr. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
136. Id. at 609.
137. Id. at 614.
138. Id. at 613.
139. In re Fink, 4 Bankr. 741 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
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the status of "an unsecured creditor [because] their filing should have
been under UCC § 9-313 rather than under UCC § 9-302(l)(d)."' 40 As
in Belmont, a factual determination of the status of the goods, fixture or
non-fixture, was separated from any legal conclusion as to who had
priority in the thing itself, and yet the two issues are linked in a tight
circle.14
Needless to say, dual filings would have assured perfection in the
above cases. In fact, the Belmont court commented: "[A] creditor that
fies its financing statement locally only is hazarding a decision in a
confusing area of the law. A court or other creditors may disagree." 42
The Belmont court proposed an odd rule indeed. Merely because fix-
tures are neither " 'fish nor fowl,' part chattel and part real estate,"1 43 is
no reason to create such a nonsensical and diseconomic rule. The
bankruptcy trustee did not rely on the collateral in order to extend
credit or to purchase or to take a mortgage on the property. He had no
rights in the collateral until the commencement of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. 44 He should take his debtor as he finds him. It is inequita-
ble to permit him to marshall prior secured assets merely because the
creditor chose "fish or fowl" instead of the more expensive "fish and
fowl." This was not the intent of the drafters. 45 Nevertheless, this is
the effect produced by the Uniform Code and its perfection method.
c. summary of thefailure of the Uniform Code'sperfection scheme
It would appear that the drafters of the Uniform Code intended
that the Code walk hand-in-hand with the new Bankruptcy Code. The
UCC drafters who predicted that a security interest perfected by any
means under Article 9 should survive the acid test where the bank-
ruptcy trustee is a hypothetical lien creditor should be correct. As the
above discussion indicates, their prediction may be wrong. Under the
Uniform version, if the fixtures secured creditor fies his financing
statement locally, and the court then decides his collateral is person-
140. 4 Bankr. at 744. See also In re Boden Mining Corp., 11 Bankr. 562, 564 (SD. W.Va.
1981), which involved a three-way dispute between two creditors and a bankruptcy trustee.
Although decided on other grounds, the court observed that if the coal washing plant was a
fixture, neither creditor perfected because neither filed "in the manner prescribed by the
Uniform Commercial Code," Le., in accordance with § 9-313.
141. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
142. In re Belmont, 1 Bankr. at 613.
143. Panel, supra note 20, at 984.
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) at note 117; Teofan, The Trusiee's Avoiding Powers Under the
Bankruptey Act and the New Code: A Comparative Analsis, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 311, 314
(1979).
145. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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alty, he may not be protected from the trustee's attack because he did
not "properly" perfect his interest. 146 If the secured creditor guesses
that his collateral is not fixtures but is personal property, and he fied
his financing statement with the Secretary of State, he may lose his
perfection and his priority when the bankruptcy court decides that the
collateral is fixtures. 147 As the following discussion will show, the Cali-
fornia approach-that the only place to perfect an interest in fixtures is
by filing a financing statement with the Secretary of State-should
eliminate the "wrong guess" dilemma and concomitant loss of
perfection.
2. The California benefit
The California approach to perfection under section 9401, in con-
junction with sections 9301 and 9313, should provide complete protec-
tion to the secured creditor from the trustee as lien creditor. In fact, the
California Committee members stated that a fixture filing is limited to
"establishing priority as against conflicting real estate interests."' 48 A
fortiori, perfection without an additional fixture filing must protect the
secured creditor in California from a trustee's attack as a hypothetical
lien creditor. When applying the substantive law of the California
Uniform Commercial Code section 9301(1)(b) or section 9313(4)(d) in
juxtaposition with Bankruptcy Code section 544(a)(1), the analysis be-
comes: perfection is required; the only place to file to perfect is in the
Office of the Secretary of State. The substantive law of the state should
then protect the perfected secured creditor from the trustee. Thus, Cal-
ifornia has avoided the consequences in bankruptcy disputes concern-
ing fixtures in the "wrong guess" scenario prevalent in the bankruptcy
courts in the states which have adopted UCC sections 9301 and 9313
''as is." The benefit is clear; the caveat is whether bankruptcy courts
will accept and honor the intent of the California Legislature. 141
146. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
147. d.
148. Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,443.
149. It also appears that congressional intent is in line with the California position. Con-
gress specified that perfection would insulate a fixture transfer from a challenge under
§ 547(e)(91)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. "This section. . . modernizes the preference pro-
visions and brings them more into conformity with commercial practice and the Uniform
Commercial Code." H.R. REP., supra note 131, at 372; S. REP., supra note 131, at 87.
Section 547(e)(1)(A), (B) provides in pertinent part: (A) a transfer of real property
other than fixtures, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a con-
tract for the sale of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such
property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be
perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee;
and (B) a transfer of afixture or property other than real property is perfected
1984] 1005
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3. A caveat for California's fixtures secured creditors
A recent decision of a California Bankruptcy Court provides the
basis for the caveat and gives a fixture secured creditor every reason to
suspect that bankruptcy judges may ignore substantive state law relat-
ing to fixtures. In reArlett"I5 involved a debtor who purchased a solar
water heater from a conditional seller. The parties entered into a secur-
ity agreement, but the secured creditor did not fie a financing state-
ment. The court noted in passing that "[t]he filing of a financing
statement is a requirement for the perfection of a security interest as
against third parties, including the Trustee."' 15 The analysis should
have been: perfection is required; the secured creditor did not perfect;
therefore, the security interest succumbs to the trustee's attack.
Had the court ended its analysis at that point, the decision would
have been unobjectionable. Instead, the court engaged in a lengthy
analysis of California real property fixture law.' 52 Because the solar
heater "was bolted to the roof of the residence, connected to and made
a part of the plumbing system, and holes were drilled in the structure,"
the heater was "deemed to be part and parcel" of the structure. 5 3
"This event transformed the character of the solar water heater from
personal property to real property."' 54 The court held that "[t]he trans-
formation of the character of the solar water heater has abrogated the
[creditor's] security interest in the solar water heater."' 155
The court's metaphysical transformation is illogical. "If a vendor
sells a horse to a vendee, and the problem arises whether the horse-
shoes on the horse were included in the bill of sale, it would not help
much to say the issue in the case was whether horseshoes had become
'horses,' ",156 By analogy, it begs the question to say that personalty, the
solar heater, had been "transformed" into realty, the structure. The
important question was who had priority in the collateral. The Arlett
when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior
to the interest of the transferree.
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A), (B) (1982) (emphasis added).
150. 22 Bankr. 732 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
151. Id. at 734.
152. Id. at 734-35. The court analyzed the common law three-part fixtures test in relation
to California real property law. This analysis cannot be reconciled with the California Uni-
form Commerical Code. Article 9 applies "[tlo any transaction. . . which is intended to
create a security interest in. . . fixtures. . . ." CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(l)(a). There is no
doubt that the creditor and the debtor in Arlelt intended to create a security interest.
153. Id. at 735.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Horowitz, supra note 5, at 30.
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court could have answered this question without resort to hoseshoe rea-
soning. The creditor never perfected his interest under section 9401 by
filing a financing statement with the Secretary of State.' 57 Therefore,
the trustee was entitled to have the creditor's interest set aside.15 8 It
would appear from the above analysis that if the bankruptcy courts in
California understood the perfection system in the California Uniform
Commercial Code, the secured creditor who properly perfected his in-
terest with the Secretary of State in goods which are fixtures would be
immune from the bankruptcy trustee's attack as lien creditor. The
Arlett case is ominous, however, because it indicates that the old confu-
sion may yet remain.
IV. THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SYSTEM
This section of the Comment first will point out the unresolved
problems remaining with the California version of section 9-313. It
then will explain how each of these problems can be resolved.
The first problem is that the perfected secured creditor may sur-
vive the attack of the bankruptcy trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor
only to succumb to his attack as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of
the realty. The second problem is that a perfected security interest will
vanish if the secured creditor has not made an additional filing-a fix-
ture filing-and a true bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer acquires
an interest in the realty.
A. The Diculty Created by the Trustee as Hypothetical Bona Fide
Purchaser of the Realty
In definitive language, the California Committee on the Uniform
Commercial Code concluded that a fixture filing with the real estate
records is limited to "establishing priority as against conflicting real
estate interests, and. . . the same rules of perfection [are to be applied]
157. 22 Bankr. at 734. The court referred to § 9402 of the Code. That section refers to
the requisites of a financing statement. Section 9401 would appear to be more on point
because the problem in the case was the lack of a filing rather than an improperly prepared
financing statement. See supra note 104.
158. At first reading, it might appear that the water heater in the debtor's residence could
have been classified as consumer goods and therefore the secured creditor's security interest
was perfected without filing. CAL. COM. CODE § 9109(1). No financing statement is re-
quired to perfect a security interest in consumer goods. CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(1)(a). The
exemption of consumer goods from filing as a means of perfection does not extend to con-
sumer goods which are fixtures: "[A] fixture filing is required for priority over conflicting
interests in fixtures to the extent provided in Section 9313." CAL. COM. CODE § 9302(1)(d).
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to goods which are fixtures as are applied to goods which are not." '59
A single filing in the real estate records does not perfect a fixture secur-
ity interest.160 Can a California secured creditor of fixtures prevail
against a bankruptcy trustee when the trustee assumes the role of a
bona fide purchaser of the realty and the perfected creditor has not
made a fixture filing? The answer should be "yes" because the security
interest is perfected. The answer, however, is "perhaps."
1. The trustee's argument
Under section 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee ac-
quires the status of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of real property.
The trustee can void a transfer of property of the debtor that would be
voidable by a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor. 16
California Uniform Commercial Code subsection 9313(4)(b) governs
the bona fide purchaser of the realty. It provides that a perfected secur-
ity interest in fixtures has priority over a conflicting real estate interest
if (1) the security interest has priority over previous real estate interests,
and (2) the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate. 62 The
purpose of this section is to give notice to the subsequent purchaser.
63
Assume that a real property owner of a restaurant purchased large
signs from a conditional seller who took a security interest in the
signs."6 The parties agreed that the signs were to remain personal
property. The secured creditor perfected his interest by filing his fi-
nancing statement with the Secretary of State as required for personal
property security interests.' 65 He did not comply with the Uniform
Code by making an additional fixture filing. The signs were anchored
159. Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,430.
160. Id. at 19,443.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1982) provides:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard to
any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may
void any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor
that is voidable by . . . a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor,
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the
status of a bona fide purchaser at the time of the commencement of the case,
whether or not such a purchaser exists.
162. See supra note 99. The Uniform version has identical provisions. See supra note 23.
163. GILMORE, supra note 33, at 834-36 (1965). Professor Gilmore suggested that a revi-
sion of the 1962 version of UCC § 9-313 might include fixture filings with the real estate
mortgages in order to provide notice to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. Id. The
Revision Committee implemented his proposal in the 1972 version of UCC § 9-313. See
U.C.C. § 9-313(4), supra note 23.
164. Cummings, Inc. v. Beardsley, 271 Ark. 596, 609 S.W.2d 66, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1133 (1980).
165. Id. at 597, 609 S.W.2d at 67, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1134.
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in concrete at the restaurant site. Assume further that the debtor de-
faulted on the underlying real property mortgage and the lender fore-
closed and sold the property to a third party. The third party would
take free of the security interest not because the secured creditor was
unperfected, but rather because the purchaser had no notice of the se-
cured creditor's interest. The purchaser "had the right to rely on the
records in the office of the [County Recorder], where filings covering
fixtures are to be made, to determine if a lien was in existence at the
time of their purchase." '66
This example clearly illustrates that the purpose of UCC section 9-
313(4)(b) is to give notice of the lien to subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees. This is unrelated to perfection. The theory is that notice is
required because a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer will pay less
if he is aware that the property is subject to the lien of another. If he
gives full value for the property, it would be unfair to hold him respon-
sible for a secret lien. Bankruptcy considerations aside, there is no
need to perfect locally; the purpose of the local filing is not to perfect
but rather to give notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbranc-
ers.'67 California has further refined this principle because it has sepa-
rated totally the concept of perfection from that of a fixture filing.
Suppose the conditional seller of'the solar water heater inArlett6
had perfected his security interest by filing a financing statement with
the Secretary of State, but had not made a local fixture filing. A subse-
quent bona fide purchaser would take the property free of the secured
creditor's interest because the purchaser had no notice of the creditor's
prior lien. Only a fixture filing would have protected his interest from
subsequent purchasers. 169 An argument can be made that the trustee,
as hypothetical bona fide purchaser, also takes the real property free of
the security interest if the perfected creditor has not made a fixture
filing.1
70
2. The trustee's argument is flawed
First, it is not clear that Congress intended this result. For prefer-
166. Id. at 600, 609 S.W.2d at 69, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1136.
167. This is the approach suggested by Professor Kripke. Kripke, supra note 1, at 60. See
also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
168. 22 Bankr. 732. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
169. CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(4)(b), supra note 99. By the same token, the fixture filing
would be irrelevant in a bankruptcy proceeding.
170. Del Gaudio, supra note 117, at 323. See also Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests
as Voidable Preferences, 3 CARDOZO L. REv. 357, 386 (1982); Shanor, A New Dealfor Se-
cured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 28 EMORY L.J. 587, 598-99 (1979).
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ence purposes under section 547(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, fix-
tures are personal property.171 A secured creditor need only perfect his
interest in personal property to protect himself from the trustee's attack
under section 547(e)(1)(B). It seems unlikely that Congress deliberately
would protect the fixtures secured creditor from an attack under this
section and, at the same time, expose the same creditor to vulnerability
under the avoidance powers conferred upon the trustee in section
544(a)(3). Legislative history indicates that the omission of a fixtures
exclusion in section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code was due to a congres-
sional oversight.
172
Second, the trustee is not a creditor who would rely on a fixture
filing. He is not a reliance creditor whom the filing system is designed
to protect,173 unlike a bona fide purchaser of the realty who inspects the
171. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B), supra note 149.
172. Breitowitz, supra note 141, at 386-87 & n.86.
The saga of Congress's attempt to wrestle with the many criticisms of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act began in 1980 when the Senate sent S. 658 to the House. H.R. REP. No.
1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1980). This bill proposed substantive changes and technical
corrections to the Bankruptcy Code. Id. S. 658 would have added "other than fixtures" to
Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(3). H.R. REP. No. 1195 at 84. Thus, this section would have been
amended to provide in pertinent part: "The trustee shall have. . . the rights and powers of,
or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor. . . that is voidable by. . .a bona fide
purchaser of real property, other thanfixtures, from the debtor ...." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). The House did not enact S. 658. S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1981).
In 1981, the Senate included the same fixtures language in S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess,
127 CONG. REC. S7893-907 (1981). The portion of S. 863 relating to commodities brokers
was enacted. Bankruptcy Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 97-222, 96 Stat. 235 (1982). Other
substantive changes and the technical corrections, including the correction relating to fix-
tures, were not.
The Senate tried again with S. 2000, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S15,673
(1981). Senator Metzenbaum summed up the reaction to S. 2000: "Along came the so-
called bankruptcy amendments of 1982, and that bill was debated, argued, amended, criti-
cized, praised, and wound up not being enacted into law." 129 CONG. REC. S5386 (1983).
Undaunted, in 1983 the Senate passed the "Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of
1983." S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 CoNG. REC. S5388 (1983); S. REP. No. 65, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983). S. 445 was sent to the House and is now pending in the Monopoly
& Commercial Law Subcommittee on Judiciary. Telephone interview with Clerk, House
Committee on Judiciary (Feb. 13, 1984). The fixtures language which would conform the
fixtures protection of 11 U.S.C. § 544 to I 1 U.S.C. § 547 is found in the Omnibus Bill. S.
445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
173. Del Gaudio, supra note 117, at 324. Although the lack of the trustee's reliance usu-
ally is irrelevant in the context of avoidance-powers issues, his failure to rely (and hence the
potential for a windfall to the estate) is important in the context of his status as a hypotheti-
cal bona fide purchaser because he expressly has been denied the avoidance power as a
hypothetical lien creditor. To hold otherwise would be to interpret the Bankruptcy Code to
be internally inconsistent. Such a statutory construction is to be avoided. See United States
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971).
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public records for liens before he invests in the property. Perfection
alone should allow the fixture financer to prevail over the trustee.
Third, California set out a perfection scheme to protect fixture se-
cured creditors from bankruptcy trustees as lien creditors.' 74 There is,
therefore, no sound reason why California fixtures secured creditors
should not be able to rely on the protection the state has given them
against the trustee in sections 9401 and 9313 of the California Uniform
Commercial Code.
3. The economic benefit in the California scheme
Finally, there is an economic benefit to the California solution to
the perfection problem. However legally practical dual filings may
be,'75 they are diseconomic. Therefore, unnecessary dual filings defeat
one of the goals of the UCC drafters, that of providing a simple and
unified structure so that secured financing transactions can go forward
at less cost and with greater certainty.'76 If the secured creditor wishes
protection only against lien creditors and bankruptcy trustees (as dis-
tinguished from reliance subsequent bona fide purchasers or mortga-
gees), he should be able to do so in the most economically efficient
manner. California's one-stop perfection process for goods which are
or could be fixtures advances the Code's goal of providing secured fi-
nancing with less cost and greater certainty. It is illogical and impracti-
cal to have the Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code at odds
with one another. Sound public policy requires that the bankruptcy
courts follow the lead of the California Legislature and adhere to the
principle that perfection of a fixture security interest with the Secretary
of State immunizes the creditor from the trustee's attack as a lien credi-
tor. Anything less confers an unintended windfall on unsecured credi-
tors. Therefore, it is inappropriate to permit the trustee to attack the
same collateral as a bona fide purchaser of the realty simply because a
court later determines the goods are fixtures. The drafters of the UCC
would do well to consider the impact of economics on the fixtures se-
cured creditor in future revisions of section 9-313.
174. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(4)(d), supra note 99.
175. There is an additional benefit to a rule requiring dual filings. The practitioner
evades the threshold definitional problem. "All that is required is that he be aware that
there is a question as to which [fixture or chattel] is involved." Shanker, supra note 3, at 797
(emphasis in original).
176. U.C.C. 9-101 comment (1972).
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
B. The True Bona Fide Purchaser Defeats the Perfected Secured
Creditor in the Absence of a Prior Fixture Filing
A perfected secured creditor who also has made a fixture filing will
prevail over a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer.'7 He prevails
because his fixture filing has given notice to the subsequent pur-
chaser/encumbrancer-not because the fixture filing perfected his in-
terest. He makes a fixture filing to minimize risk of loss from the
purchaser or encumbrancer. However, in a situation where the per-
fected secured creditor does not make a fixture filing, the creditor may
not know that the goods have or may become fixtures. Nevertheless,
the cost of making an additional filing outweighs the risk that a pres-
ently unknown purchaser or mortgagee may come upon the scene and
strip him of his priority.'7 8 This will be true particularly where the
debt is small and the agreement is for a short term.
Section 9313 not only establishes priorities, it allocates risk be-
tween the secured creditor and real estate interests. Under section
9313(4)(b), 7 9 the risk is placed upon the secured creditor because he
will lose his priority unless he makes dual filings. Such a risk alloca-
tion can be supported only if the secured creditor has knowledge of the
risk and the ability to spread transaction costs.' 80 This section of the
Comment will describe the circumstances under which a secured credi-
tor might not make a fixture filing. It then will establish a framework
for analyzing who (secured creditor or bona fide purchaser) is in the
best position to bear the risk if a fixture filing is not made. Finally, it
will suggest a structure for establishing priorities when a perfected se-
cured creditor has not made an additional fixture filing.
1. The economics behind a security interest in fixtures-in-place
A conflict between a secured creditor of fixtures-in-place and a
real property interest was the situation the California Supreme Court
faced in Goldie v. Bauchet Properties. 81 California Uniform Commer-
cial Code section 9313(5) would have protected Goldie because when
177. See Final Report, supra note 22, at 19,443-44, comment 4(c).
178. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
179. CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(4)(b). See supra note 99.
180. Transaction costs are "the costs of effecting a transfer of rights ... " R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30 (2d ed. 1977). Real property law gives the right to fixtures
to the real property owner. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1013, supra note 75. The transfer of
rights within the context of section 9313 is from the owner of the realty to the secured credi-
tor of the fixtures. See supra note 99. Transaction costs, therefore, are all the costs of ac-
quiring that right from the real property owner.
181. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 540 P.2d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1975).
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the debtor's rights to remove the machine terminated, Goldie would
have had a "reasonable time" in which to remove the machine.'
Also, after Goldie, a tenant's trade fixtures are personal property cov-
ered by Article 9.183 A lender of trade fixtures-in-place has the most
clear-cut path of any fixture lender to protect his interests. 184 Requir-
ing a second filing with the real estate records can be supported
economically.
a. transaction costs
A creditor must have access to information before he can evaluate
the costs of acquiring and processing it. In a typical transaction relat-
ing to a loan where fixtures-in-place are the proffered collateral, the
creditor knows the collateral consists of fixtures. The borrower makes
written application for a loan. In his application, the borrower pro-
vides information as to the location of the fixture, and whether he is a
tenant or owner of the property where the fixture is located. If he is a
tenant, the lender has two choices under section 9313(5). He can obtain
from the landlord a written waiver of his interest in the fixtures,185 or
he can determine from the landlord that the tenant has the right to
remove the fixtures at the end of the term. 8 6 In either case, the lender
will be secure if he loans on the fixture collateral. He must, of course,
perfect his interest if he wishes protection from an attack from a bank-
ruptcy trustee but, under the Code, he need not perfect or make a fix-
ture filing to protect his interest against the existing owner. 187
An identical process is followed where the fixtures are encumbered
along with the real property. The fixture lender inspects the property
and the public records to determine if there is an existing mortgage on
the real property. Either he gets a written waiver from the first mortga-
gee as to the fixtures' or he determines by examining the lease that
the tenant has the right to remove the goods as against the mortga-
gee.'89 If neither requirement is fulfilled, the loan probably will not be
made.
182. CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(5), supra note 99.
183. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
184. This assumes that the secured creditor recognizes the collateral as a fixture. Cf.
supra note 175 and accompanying text.
185. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(5)(a), supra note 99.
186. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(5)(b), supra note 99.
187. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(5)(a), (b), supra note 99.
188. See supra note 63.
189. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(5)(b), supra note 99.
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b. the best cost spreader
The rationale behind this scheme can be supported by economic
reasoning. In this situation, the fixtures financer is in the best position
to ascertain the status of the proposed collateral. He is the party with
access to information; 9 ' he has a loan application and is in a position
to verify its information. The transactional cost of obtaining informa-
tion can be passed on to the borrower.' 9'
If the secured creditor wishes protection against a subsequent bona
fide purchaser or encumbrancer, he must incur additional costs; he
must make a fixture filing under section 93 13(4)(b). 192 This cost is min-
imal, however, because he already has incurred the expenses of gather-
ing information and inspecting the collateral. Further, because this is a
known cost, it also can be passed on to the borrower. The borrower
benefits because he gets needed financing and can, in turn, pass the cost
on to the ultimate consumer of his business output. It is economically
justified, therefore, to place the burden of providing notice by means of
a fixture filing on the secured creditor as opposed to placing the burden
of a search of the chattel records on a subsequent purchaser or
encumbrancer. 193
c. the cheapest cost avoider
An additional economic reason supports placing the burden of a
fixture filing on the lender in this situation. Risk of loss should be
placed on the party who could have avoided the problem at least
cost. 194 This gives that party an incentive to avoid the loss. Assume the
lender does not make a fixture filing and the real property is subse-
quently purchased by a bona fide purchaser. Assume further that the
value of the fixture is substantial. Because the purchaser was without
notice, he will pay more for the realty than its fair market value; a
portion of the property, the fixtures, was encumbered.'95 It is the fix-
190. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
191. The process of passing costs on to others sometimes is called "internalization."
Costs are thus shared by all interested parties. See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347-57 (1967). An "externality" is an external cost which the
decision-maker does not take into account in pricing his goods; some segment of society
bears the cost. R. POSNER, supra note 180, at 51-52.
192. CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(4)(b), supra note 99.
193. Economic justification in one case, however, is an insufficient reason to maintain a
dual filing system for all cases. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
194. See R. POSNER, supra note 180, at 177 (liability should be placed on the person who
could have avoided the problem at the least cost).
195. A different result is possible if the value of the fixtures is negligible in relation to the
cost of the real property. See infra text accompanying note 206.
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ture financer who could have avoided the problem at the least cost by
providing notice by means of a fixture filing. If the burden was placed
on the purchaser, he would have the expense of acquiring information
which the fixture lender already has acquired. Obtaining information
probably is more costly than making a fixture filing.1 96 According to
the theory of least cost avoidance, the purchaser without notice should
(and does) take free of the fixture financer's perfected security interest
if the fixture financer has failed to make a fixture filing.197
2. The purchase money security interest in fixtures
The purchase money secured creditor may not be the cheapest cost
avoider. Normally he extends credit before the goods become fixtures.
Assume that a conditional vendor sold grain storage bins to the owner
of real property.198 Buyer and seller executed a security agreement
which included the provision that, upon default, the debtor "shall as-
semble the goods and make them available to secured party at a place
reasonably convenient to both parties."' 9 9 Thus, the vendor extended
credit before the goods became fixtures. In addition, the parties treated
the goods as personal property and not fixtures. The security agree-
ment also showed that both parties believed that the grain bins were
personal property. The secured creditor filed a financing statement, but
he did not make a fixture filing.2"o
Under the Uniform Code, if the bins were fixtures, the vendor
could have protected his purchase money security interest "by a fixture
filing before the goods [became] fixtures or within ten days thereaf-
ter." '' This also would have perfected his interest under the Uniform
Code.202 In an actual case the vendor lost his priority because the court
decided the bins were fixtures.2 3
Two questions arise. First, how is the vendor to know the goods
will become fixtures and, second, why should a preferred interest under
196. Cost of filing a financing statement with the real estate records is $4 for the first page
and $1 for each additional page. Information provided by the Clerk of the Office of the Los
Angeles County Recorder. A typical financing statement is one page. See CAL. COM. CODE
§ 9402 (West Supp. 1984) for a suggested form.
197. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(4)(b), supra note 99.
198. See Coming Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949, 26 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1367 (1979).
199. Id. at 72, 576 S.W.2d at 951, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1369.
200. Id.
201. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a), supra note 23. See also CAL. COM. CODE § 9313(4)(a), supra
note 99.
202. See U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(b), supra note 23.
203. 265 Ark. at 76-77, 576 S.W.2d at 954, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1370-71.
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the Code, a purchase money security interest,2" bear the risk of loss as
against an encumbrancer or purchaser of the real property? The fol-
lowing discussion will illustrate why the vendor does not always know
that his goods are or will become fixtures. Because of this lack of
knowledge, perhaps he should not bear the risk of loss against a bona
fide purchaser.
a. the vendor who unknowingly fails to make a secondfling
The vendor of goods does have access to information as to the
creditworthiness of his buyer. He also has access to means of verifying
the information the prospective purchaser provides. What the seller
does not have is access to reliable information at reasonable cost con-
cerning the future status of the goods he sells. He can ask what the
purchaser intends to do with a portable dishwasher, for example. The
vendee may say that he is going to place it in an apartment building he
owns. 20 5 Therefore, the conditional seller does not make a fixture fil-
ing. Later, the purchaser remodels the kitchen and installs the portable
dishwasher under the kitchen countertop. No one would seriously sug-
gest that a seller of several hundred portable dishwashers each year
should pursue each debtor to determine whether the seller needs to
make a fixture filing because the buyer anchored the portable dish-
washer to realty.
204. See generally U.C.C. § 9-312 (1972); CAL. COM. CODE § 9312 (West Supp. 1984); see
also Creedon, Some Reactions to the Review Committee's Proposal to Amend the Fixture Pro-
visions of the Code, 25 Bus. LAW. 313, 315 (1969) ("the purchase money financer ... has a
strong equitable right to priority over conflicting interests").
205. In this case, the dishwasher would be classified under the Code as equipment be-
cause it is bought for use in a business, the rental unit. U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (1972); CAL. COM.
CODE § 9109(2) (West Supp. 1984). Because the dishwasher is for business use, the vendor
must file a financing statement to perfect his interest in the collateral.
The purchaser could also say that the dishwasher is going to be used in his residence.
The dishwasher then would be classified as consumer goods. U.C.C. § 9-109(1); CAL. COM.
CODE § 9109(l). The vendor need not file a financing statement to perfect his interest in
consumer goods unless the goods will become fixtures. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1972); CAL.
COM. CODE § 9302(l)(d) (West Supp. 1984). See supra note 158. A vendor would consider
the dishwasher to be consumer goods and therefore consider his interest perfected because
no filing is required. The catch 22 is that if the vendee attaches the dishwasher to realty, a
filing is required.
There is, of course, no way for a vendor to ascertain whether the vendee may change his
mind about his stated intended use, or lie about it in the first place. It is Byzantine to say
that if the secured creditor "wants to be fully secure. . . [he] has to either spy on the debtor
• . . or else file doubly, first in the chattel records and then in the realty records." Headrick,
supra note 116, at 49.
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b. the vendor who knowingly chooses not to make a fixture filing
A conditional seller may also decide that the costs of making a
fixture filing outweigh his risk of loss to a bona fide purchaser. Con-
sider the conditional seller of portable spas. He sells thousands of units
per year on short-term installment sale contracts. Some, even many, of
the purchasers construct decking around the units or otherwise make
them "built-ins." As an inducement to sale, the homeowner may not
dismantle his handiwork when he sells his property. The new buyer
pays nothing extra for the spa. Although the conditional seller of the
spa knew it might become a fixture, he consciously assumed the risk of
loss because of the cost of making a fixture filing and because his expo-
sure to the risk of a subsequent bona fide purchaser is only for the
relatively short life of the installment sale contract. The buyer of the
realty obtains a windfall merely because he had no notice of the condi-
tional seller's interest.
A search of the chattel records is less costly relative to the purchase
price of the realty2" 6 than is the cost of a fixture filing relative to the
purchase price of a dishwasher or spa.2 °7 For example, assume a house
sells for $100,000208 and a portable dishwasher for $400. Putting aside
all transaction costs, the $4 filing fee209 to file a financing statement
with the County Recorder's Office represents one percent of the cost of
the dishwasher. On the other hand, assuming a search cost of the chat-
tel records of approximately $28,210 the cost of such a search to the
206. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
207. The cost for a search of the chattel records in Sacramento is $5 for the first page of
information and $1 for each additional page. Searches of the chattel records are commonly
done by title search services. The service charges approximately $20 for the search of a
single debtor, plus the $5 fee and $3 for "special handling" which enables it to acquire the
data in approximately 10 days. A private individual who undertakes his own search often
must wait several months for a response by mail. Telephone interview with Representative
of Cal. Title-Search, Inc., 1005 Twelfth St., Ste. No. 10, Sacramento, CA 95814 (Feb. 16,
1984).
208. The median value of a single family residence in California in 1980 was $84,500.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83,
755 (103d ed. 1982). Values are higher in California's two major cities: Los Angeles,
$96,100; San Francisco, $103,900. Id. at 756. Thus, the $100,000 figure selected to illustrate
the example is a reasonable one on which to base the calculation.
209. Telephone interview with the Clerk, Los Angeles County Recorder's Office (Feb. 14,
1984).
210. The author acknowledges that this approach seems more easily applied where the
debtor owns the realty than where the debtor is a tenant. A prudent purchaser or encum-
brancer of realty, however, gets copies of lease agreements as a condition of the contract of
sale. He thus acquires the information he needs to search the chattel records. The search
costs are increased to the extent that each search will cost approximately $28. A greater
number of tenants, however, indicates a greater purchase price for the realty. It would be a
1984]
LOYOLA4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
purchaser or encumbrancer of the realty represents a mere .028 percent
of the price of the property. It is not unreasonable to expect a similar
relative percentage disparity between, for instance, the cost of an air
conditioning system versus the price of a commercial or industrial
building. In this instance, the burden of filing and risk of loss is placed
more equitably on the purchaser of the realty. Alternatively, all re-
cording of chattel and real estate interests might be made in a central
filing system located in the Office of the Secretary of State. 21 1
C Three Proposals Which Will Eliminate the Unresolved Problems
1. The UCC should adopt the California perfection scheme
The confusion which exists as to whether the bankruptcy trustee
may shift gears from lien creditor to bona fide purchaser in order to
seize secured personal property which also may be fixtures must be re-
solved by Congress. If, as expected, Congress limits the trustee to his
status as lien creditor in fixture cases, the California perfection scheme
should eliminate disputes between the perfected secured creditor and
the trustee. Regardless of whether a court later holds that the collateral
is a fixture, the secured creditor will be perfected with a single state
filing. This also eliminates the initial definitional problem inherent in
fixture law because the creditor need not determine the nature of the
collateral in order to know where to perfect his interest. Therefore, the
Review Committee for the Uniform Commercial Code should adopt
the California perfection plan.
2. California and the UCC Review Committee should insert a
knowledge requirement into subsection 9-313(4)(a), (b) to
protect the bona fide fixtures vendor
This Comment also proposes that if a purchase money vendor
does not know, or have reason to know, that the chattels he sells will
become fixtures, he should not be held to the provisions of subsection
(4)(a) and (4)(b) of both the UCC section 9-313 and the California Uni-
form Commercial Code section 9313.212 The burden should be on the
rare case indeed where the total search costs would equal the 1% of the purchase price found
in the dishwasher hypothetical. It is conceded that the higher the cost of the goods in rela-
tion to the cost of the realty, the lower the percentage of filing fee relative to the cost of the
goods. For example, in the case of a $4,000 spa, the $4 filing free represents .01% of the total
cost of the collateral. Obviously, the heaviest burden is on the vendor of less expensive
goods if he must file two financing statements, the first with the Secretary of State and the
second locally.
211. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
212. U.C.C. § 9-313, supra note 23; CAL. COM. CODE § 9313, supra note 99.
1018 [Vol. 17
ARTICLE 9 AND FIXTURES
purchaser to search the chattel records to make certain that there are no
liens on goods included in the conveyance. If the purchaser does not
make the search, he should bear the risk of loss, that is, he should take
the real property subject to the chattel liens. Therefore, California and
the UCC Review Committee should amend the Codes by inserting a
knowledge provision into subsection 9-313(4)(a), (b).
3. California and the UCC drafters should deal forthrightly with
the issue of a unitary state filing system
If the purchaser must search the chattel records for purchase
money security interests covering goods which are included in the con-
veyance, perhaps the better alternative is to establish a single filing sys-
tem for all security interests, encumbrances, and conveyances of
personal and real property with the Secretary of State. Computeriza-
tion of record-keeping makes this feasible and economical. The UCC
draftsmen viewed section 9-313 as a "workable compromise" between
inconsistent objectives, "namely, a total desire to protect real estate in-
terests and a total desire to protect chattel interests. 2 13 It seems, how-
ever, that this is not a "compromise." Rather, the balance in fixture
law is tipped strongly in favor of real estate interests. "The true expla-
nation of the 'real estate filing' is political: it is expedient to avoid a
bitter and protracted battle [with real estate interests] by casting on the
holder of the fixture security interest the additional burden of making a
real estate filing." 214 A unified filing system would restore the balance,
no matter how politically unpopular the concept is.
V. CONCLUSION
California has taken a remarkable step forward in unraveling
some of the tangles in fixture law. All definitional problems vanish as
to the lien creditor, including the bankruptcy trustee, because perfec-
tion of the security interest always takes place in one location, the Of-
fice of the Secretary of State. The UCC Review Committee should
adopt the California approach.
Congress must act in order to protect the secured creditor from the
bankruptcy trustee as bona fide purchaser of the realty. This is neces-
sary to protect (1) the fixture financer who does not make a fixture fil-
ing because the transaction costs are excessive relative to the value of
the goods and (2) the financer who does not make a fixture filing be-
213. Panel, supra note 20, at 982.
214. GILMORE, supra note 33, at 817-18.
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cause he does not know that the collateral has become a fixture. Fur-
ther, the bona fide fixtures vendor without knowledge that the goods
have or will become fixtures should be protected from the true bona
fide purchaser. California subsection 9313(4)(a), (b) and UCC subsec-
tion 9-313(4)(a), (b) should be amended to include a knowledge
requirement.
The next step that should be taken by both California and the
Uniform Commercial Code Review Committee is to unify the local
real estate recording offices with the state chattel recording office. One
data bank for real estate, fixture, and chattel interests would benefit
both real estate interests and fixture secured creditors because the fix-
ture secured creditors need make only one filing and the real estate
purchasers need make only one search. The author concedes that
adoption of a unitary filing system is unlikely. An alternative would be
to require dual filings for all goods which conceivably might become
fixtures. This would eliminate the trap for the unwary and the extra
cost will be factored into the cost of credit.
Charlotte Costan
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